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With new and comprehensive data on the international spread of listed and unlisted corporations 
before the First World War we show the prominence of common law and Scandinavian civil law in 
the process. We interpret this association as demonstrating the strong contribution of liberal 
(laissez-faire) industrial stances. We confirm an extended version of Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
hypothesis that trade and capital openness are necessary for companies to flourish. Despite the 
possibilities companies created for fraud and exploitation, countries more extensively using the 
corporate form before 1914 had higher GDP per capita. Through this process, the benefit of 
imperialism extended to British dominions but not much, if at all, to British dependent colonies.  
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The Diffusion and Impact of the Corporation in 1910 
Mr Goldbury:           Some seven men form an Association, 
(If possible, all Peers and Baronets) 
They start off with a public declaration 
To what extent they mean to pay their debts. 
  Though a Rothschild you may be 
In your own capacity, 
As a Company you've come to utter sorrow - 
But the Liquidators say, 
"Never mind - you needn't pay," 
So you start another Company tomorrow!… 
King.  Well, at first sight it strikes us as dishonest, 
But if it's good enough for virtuous England - 
The first commercial country in the world - 
It's good enough for us. 
W S Gilbert and A Sullivan Utopia (Limited) or The Flowers of Progress 1893  
 
Gilbert and Sullivan’s low expectations for the globalisation of the companies in their day were 
reinforced two years later by the UK Comptroller-General for Bankruptcies. His report complained 
that many joint stock companies were liquidated simply to defraud creditors1. This pessimism about 
early corporate law is echoed by many historians of Britain but contrasts starkly with pervasive 
Washington consensus triumphalism in which limited liability companies2 are a key component of 
the financial development essential for economic growth3. To the extent that the spread of such 
organisations constitutes new industry entry, they will foster competition and economic growth4.   
 
In the terminology of Acemoglu and Robinson companies are an economic institution that might be 
extractive (according to Gilbert and Sullivan) or inclusive (the common present day view)5. When 
they are inclusive they allow wide participation by the population to make best use of their talents, 
fostering investment, coordination and efficiency. Extractive companies – suggested candidates have 
included the East India Company, US Steel or some investment bankers today - expropriate 
resources from the rest of society, by fraud and misrepresentation, by erecting entry barriers, by 
                                                          
1
 Board of Trade 12
th
 annual report into the Bankruptcv Act. 
2
 We use the terms ‘corporation’ and ‘company’ interchangeably, ignoring legal niceties such as whether they 
all had limited liability. Technically corporations can include some non-profit organisations such as universities 
and municipalities (which we try to exclude) and the term “company” was commonly used at the time (but is 
not used here by us) to include partnerships (as is less common in British English today but remains the norm 
for equivalents in many other languages). 
3
 See Cheffins Corporate ownership and control and Johnson Making the market. Levine ’Financial. 
development and economic growth’: Rajan and Zingales ‘Financial dependence and growth’: Sylla and Wright 
‘Corporation formation in the antebellum United States’, for triumphalism. 
4
 Klapper et al., ‘Entry regulation’. 
5
 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail. 
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political lobbying or by suppressing or manipulating the functioning of markets. Extractive economic 
institutions are typically formed or supported by extractive political institutions that concentrate 
power in a narrow elite and place few limitations on their power. 
 
To identify whether the corporation in 1910 was primarily an extractive or inclusive institution we 
consider the nature of the supply permitted by political elites, governments and potential lobbyists. 
In the supply of companies, the extent of investor protection provided by national legal systems may 
play a role6. The advantages of common law have been a prominent centre of attention. In turn legal 
practice or formulation could well be influenced by more deep seated culture and religion7. But 
political structures and pressure groups can be expected to try to block company developments that 
impinge on incumbent interests, unless there are countervailing inclusive institutions able to resist8. 
Corporate regulation can be ’captured’ by vested interests and company formation suppressed to 
prevent competition. 
 
Among the most prominent institutions that may have enhanced or detracted from the operation of 
world markets before the First World War was the British Empire, not least because almost all 
common law countries (with the notable exception of the United States) were members. If the 
Empire was a boon for markets it will have stimulated both the international spread of companies 
and their contribution to economic development. Companies therefore offer an opportunity to 
examine the supposed extractive institutions of the British Empire, because a large proportion of the 
countries for which data can be found were then members of the Empire9.  
The present exercise utilises international company data for 1910 to estimate what determines the 
supply of companies and to assess their impact on economic development10. With this new data set, 
unprecedented in coverage, new light is cast upon the institutional concomitants of economic 
development. An international cross-section for a single year has some limitations for statistical 
inference11. It might be thought that a panel data set would support more convincing results but 
panels must span a very lengthy period of time to capture country-level changes in legal system, 
religion or political system. 
                                                          
6
 LaPorta et al., ‘Law and finance’; Kuran  Islamic law; Klapper et al. ‘Entrepreneurship and firm formation’. 
7
 Stulz and Williamson ’Culture, openness and finance’.  
8
  Rajan and Zingales ‘The Great Reversals’; Pagano and Volpin ’Corporate governance’. 
9
 Acemoglu and Robinson Why nations fail; Accominotti et al. ‘Black man’s burden’. 
10
 Our sources and data are described in Hannah, ‘A Global corporate census’ and more fully in its online 
statistical appendixes. 
11
 Luintel et al., ‘Financial structure and economic growth’. 
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In the following section (1) we explain the essential characteristics of the institution on which we 
focus. We move on in section 2 to describe the bivariate relations between the stock of companies 
and the various possible contributors to their supply. This approach allows us to maximise the 
number of countries in the comparison. Then in section 3 we use regression analysis on a necessarily 
more restricted data set to decide the principal contributors to the supply of companies. In this 
section we also establish the GDP consequences of companies and thereby calculate the net effect 
on GDP of exogenous influences-, legal background, industrial policies and the British Empire - 
nurturing or suppressing this institution. 
I 
A company or a corporation is a ‘fuzzy’ concept. At the most general level it is a grouping of persons 
collaborating to do what they cannot achieve so well separately. In economic terms the boundaries 
between companies and other institutions for production are not always perfectly clear but, we 
contend, they are clear enough for operational purposes.  
 
We ignore legal and contemporary niceties, using the modern terms corporation and company 
loosely and interchangeably. Generally Hannah’s global corporate data for 83 countries in 1910 (and 
hence ours) include all the capitalist organisations known as corporations in the US or UK (in the 
latter they were more commonly referred to as joint stock companies) and their approximate 
foreign language equivalents: sociétés anonymes in France, aktiebolag in Sweden, kabushiki kaisha 
in Japan and so on12. In each case these included some public (often listed or traded) and some 
private (close) companies. Therefore where there were separate legal forms, approximately 
corresponding to public and private companies (such as AGs and GmbHs in German-speaking 
countries), both are also included13. Some (generally small)14 wholly or partially limited liability 
entities, such as sociétés en commandite (limited partnerships), are excluded, though we follow 
contemporary statistical practice by including commandites with shares (French sociétés en 
commandites par actions or German KGaAs), which tended to be more like corporations.  
 
                                                          
12
 Hannah ‘A global corporate census’. 
13
 As are Bergrechtiche Gewerkschaften, a modernised version of a medieval German multi-ownership form for 
mines, common in German and Austrian heavy industry. 
14
 But not all: Solvay - the largest European chemical firm in 1910 - had F40m capital but was then a simple. 
Belgian commandite partnership without shares, so is excluded. 
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Such boundaries are definitionally fuzzy and though the available national statistics do not always 
facilitate perfection, they have a rough and ready consistency.15 The great majority of the 
organisations included had all, or most, of the classic characteristics of corporate modernity, present 
in earlier centuries, but substantially developed, standardized and perfected during the nineteenth. 
These included separate legal personality (allowing them to sue and be sued, own land and/or affix a 
seal in their own name), perpetual succession (facilitating, though not guaranteeing, continuity even 
when shares pass by death or otherwise to new owners)16, entity shielding (creditors could not 
pursue the company’s assets for claims against individual shareholders)17 and limited liability 
(shareholders were liable only for the amount they had subscribed).  
 
Some companies had additional privileges: for example, the note issuing powers of central banks 
(then investor-owned utilities) or the compulsory purchase (in American English eminent domain) 
rights of railways. There is now a growing literature emphasising that the relative importance of 
these characteristics was not the same in the nineteenth century as today18, but by 1910 the world 
was already well advanced on its modern trajectory. Limited liability, for example, was then a clearly 
specified characteristic of the great majority of companies, but not of absolutely all of them.19  
 
Most companies in 1910 (by number) were private and unquoted (a few had only one stockholder, 
many had only several) 20, but most corporate capital by value was quoted on stock exchanges or 
otherwise tradable. Listed companies tended to be more widely held, many with thousands of 
stockholders, and already several hundred companies numbered their holders in the tens of 
thousands. Rajan and Zingales confine their discussion to such companies quoted on major 
exchanges, implying, for example, that St Petersburg was quite close to the New York Stock 
Exchange (in terms of such corporate values as a portion of GDP), but the US had many more private 
companies than Russia, as our more inclusive number and value statistics show21. Hannah discusses 
the implications of adopting even more expansive definitions of the company form, but most 
                                                          
15
 For example, for some countries we necessarily follow national statistical practice by including some 
incorporated non-capitalist organisations (mutual insurers, learned societies etc). 
16
 Blair ‘Corporate Law’. 
17
 Hansmann et al., ‘Law and the rise of the firm’. 
18
 Campbell and Turner ‘Substitutes for legal protection’; Freeman, Pearson and Taylor Corporate governance. 
19
 California had proportional rather than limited liability until 1932 and where there was a choice on 
registration (as In Britain) a few companies chose to be unlimited; some banks had double or reserve liabilities. 
20
 Passow Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung, pp. 223-4, gives the example of Krupp. 
21
 Rajan and Zingales, ‘The Great Reversals’. 
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adjustments would be marginal. The main exception would be the inclusion of all commandites, on 
the grounds that, unlike most ordinary partnerships, they had partially limited liability22.  
 
II 
The scheme that we explore in this section considers deep structural influences upon the numbers 
of companies in a country; culture, law and political regime. These may have direct and indirect 
effects. The indirect effects include restrictive policies which have consequences for economic 
openness, especially foreign trade, while foreign trade in turn may affect the density of companies. 
Ultimately we want to specify a model that allows for companies either to raise or lower GDP per 
capita, and for numbers of companies to respond to the opportunities created by higher national 
output and productivity. These relations are sketched in figure 1. On the left are the deep structural 
variables that must be exogenous to company numbers and other economic influences. On the right 
and in the centre are variables that are likely to be simultaneously determined;  
We extend Rajan and Zingales’ (RZ) hypothesis that trade and capital openness are necessary for 
financial development and for listed public companies to flourish, to all the companies covered by 
our sample23. Incumbent interests are least able to coordinate to obstruct or reverse the spread of 
companies when RZ’s two conditions, openness to trade and high international capital mobility, are 
fulfilled. 1910 was a good year for international capital mobility but trade openness varied 
considerably. In figure 1 the hypothesis is represented by the link from policy to companies and from 
exports to companies, perhaps through policy. 
Figure 1: Influences on and effects of companies in 1910 
 
                                                          
22
 Hannah, “Organisational menus.” 
23
 Rajan and Zingales ‘The great reversals’. 
COMPANIES 
Law 
GDP per capita 
Policy Politics 
Culture 
Exports/Imports 
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Circumstances preventing these interests from restricting foreign trade are the same as those lifting 
their constraints on the development of domestic institutions; export intensity is simply a 
manifestation - or otherwise. When imports are impeded to suppress competition, domestic 
resources are diverted to supplying the home market and exports are cut as well, - if trade is to 
balance. After controlling for ‘natural‘ influences upon national trade openness - particularly the size 
of the country - trade intensity reflects the extent to which vested interests are inhibiting 
development. But trade intensity is not necessarily the only appropriate measure of restrictive 
policies adopted – the political system may be another. The bolder arrows in figure 1 indicate the 
relationships that we find most important later in this paper. In the remainder of the section with a 
series of tabulations we describe how the deep structural variables are associated with the numbers 
of companies per head and the importance of corporate capital related to GDP in different countries 
in 1910. We also consider the association of the variables with a measure of ‘capture’ by incumbent 
interests – exports per head. 
 
English common law, it is sometimes claimed, drives the development of good institutions, including 
the corporation This legal system supposedly is much superior to French and German civil law 
systems in its supply of investor protection, essential to avoiding ‘agency problems’ with joint stock 
company directors24. However, factors that promote securitization (such as common law rights of 
shareholders or anti-director rights) may have ambiguous effects on corporatization, particularly as 
measured by the numbers of companies. Weak disclosure requirements or shareholder rights may 
inhibit stock market IPOs but encourage use of the close corporation, especially in countries where 
private companies were not exempted from stringent public company regulations.25    
We adopt non-European (e.g. Islamic) law and mixed systems as the base case and distinguish from 
this the four categories of Scandinavian, French and German civil law and common law systems. 
Although England and Wales and many British colonies adhered to the common law tradition, the 
Scots and French Canadians were different. Nonetheless we count the UK and Canada as common 
law countries26. We do the same for Indian Native States (which used India’s company law) and 
Gambia (because most of its five companies were formed under British law). Matching the company 
                                                          
24
 LaPorta et al., ‘Law and finance’. 
25
 For example in Germany AGs (public companies) were required to appoint an Aufsichtsrat (supervisory 
board) and publish accounts, but GmbHs (private companies) were exempt from these requirements (Krüger, 
Das Reichgesetz, pp. 20-3).  
26
 But not Malta, which retained civil law, despite membership of the British Empire. 
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data with common law yields a sample of 21 countries27. Of these in 1910 only one is not British, the 
United States (table 1 below)28. Clearly English common law and Scandinavian civil law countries 
were far more fecund in companies than the rest; apparently civil law per se was not harmful to the 
spread of the corporation because the Scandinavians were able to generate far more companies per 
head than common law countries. 
On the other hand Scandinavian civil law companies were on average smaller in relation to GDP than 
those in common law countries. They were little different from those in French civil law countries, 
but both were more dominant in the economy than corporations in German civil law countries. At 
first sight common law countries appear to encourage corporatisation (table 1) – though what this 
contributed to economic growth and development in 1910 remains to be demonstrated. 
Under a civil law system, Norway seems to have developed effective corporate governance without 
any statutory corporate law29. Norway had more corporations per head of population in 1910 than 
any European country30. Substantial protections were available to minority shareholders against 
expropriation by corporate ‘insiders’. By contrast Islamic law, it has been contended, was especially 
harmful for development31. We may also note that if common law really did promote the spread of 
companies, and companies stimulated economic growth, we would expect to find an impact of 
common law on economic development. A natural experiment in South Africa casts doubt on 
whether such an effect can be found32.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27
 US, UK, Uganda, Straits settlements, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Rhodesia,, Nigeria, Newfoundland, New 
Zealand, Kenya, Hong Kong, Gambia, Gold Coast, Gibraltar, Federated Malay States, Ceylon, Canada, British 
India, Indian Native States, Australia. 
28
 Adding up the bracketed figures in column 1, table 1 shows that there are 83 countries in the legal system/ 
company numbers comparison. In contrast there are only 34 countries for which a stock value/ legal system 
comparison can be made.  
29
 Ostergaard and Smith ‘Corporate Governance’. 
30
 Hannah ‘A global corporate census’. 
31
 Kuran ‘Islamic law’. 
32
 Brunt ‘Property rights and economic growth’. 
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 Table 1: Regulatory capture, law and the spread of companies c. 1910 
 
Companies/population 
(no. of countries) 
Corporate stock 
value at par/GDP% 
(no. of countries) 
Exports per head 
(US$ 1913) (no. 
of countries) 
Common law 662* (21) 156* (8) 48* (19) 
Scandinavian civil 
law 
1,285* (4) 49 (4) 41 (4) 
French civil law 159 (24) 44 (12) 30 (22) 
German civil law 103 (10) 32 (7) 10 (9) 
Others 147* (24) 25 (3) 18 (8) 
 Note * signifies significantly different from sample mean at 5% level. These mean values are not  
 weighted by the number of companies in a country. 
Both common law countries and Scandinavian law are associated with company intensiveness but 
what does the correlation signify? Most countries had corporation statutes or commercial codes, so 
the common/civil law difference lay only in the extent to which judges could modify laws by applying 
general principles as opposed to simply interpreting the statute. These two categories therefore 
probably identify nations which adopted ‘hands off’, liberal or permissive industrial policy, in 
contrast to those that were highly regulatory (France/Germany) or entirely repressive (some 
independent poor countries). The colons in Saigon sometimes sadly compared their situation with 
that of British colonists neighbouring Indochina33.  Scandinavian and common law countries pursued 
generally liberal industrial policies and this seems to have permitted relatively abundant company 
formation34. Such an interpretation is supported especially if the highly regulatory systems were 
more prone to capture. Consistent with the Rajan and Zingales hypothesis, French civil law and 
German civil law countries achieved lower exports per head than the liberal economies (table 1)35.  
 
Potentially the date of general incorporation legislation is a determinant of the level of 
corporatization. Except in the case of major wars and revolutions and brief retreats in severe 
depressions, the annual number of corporate births consistently exceeds the number of corporate 
deaths in all nations, so an obvious variable to include in a model is the date at which incorporation 
became easy and normal. For many advanced countries (most US states, the UK, France, Germany) 
and some others (India, Hong Kong, Orange Free State) this came with general registration laws 
(eliminating the need for individual legislative or executive approval) in the period 1840-1870, while 
                                                          
33
 Bulletin Financier.  
34
 Frankema ‘Origins of formal education’ shows the strengths and weaknesses of what a ‘liberal’ policy meant 
in practice for the adjacent field of education in sub-Saharan Africa before 1940. 
35
 League of Nations Memorandum on Balance of Payments p150 table VII. 
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for others (Russia, Thailand, Greece) even as late as 1910 such liberality still remained in the future. 
Unfortunately, a date of general incorporation variable proves difficult to define across all countries 
(early registration statutes were often not truly general but restricted to single industries, small 
firms or small sub-national areas) and more relevant in some countries than others. In Germany 
incorporation by simple registration in 1870 led to a substantial increase, as again did its 1892 
statute introducing simpler GmbH incorporations. By contrast in the US and UK promiscuous 
company formation pre-dated simplified registration laws, which therefore less noticeably 
accelerated what was a more continuously increasing flow of incorporation.36 General registration 
dates may have been endogenous to the process of economic development and not exogenous, like 
legal systems and, perhaps, policy styles.   
 
Possible influences on company numbers include prohibitions of incorporation for certain categories 
(lawyers, retail shops), or of firms below a certain size. Other discouragements of incorporation were 
discriminatory taxation, high registration fees, and compulsory notarisation. But the variety of such 
constraints, and the fact that they were not always incorporated in accessible legislation or codes, 
make it difficult to summarise them quantitatively37. We do not doubt that such variables had some 
impact on the level of corporatization, so to the extent that such deterrents are not proxied by our 
measures for ‘liberalisation’, our model may be under-specified. 
 
National legal traditions relate the legal system to the culture of which they are a partial expression. 
Hence Stulz and Williamson maintain that differences in culture, proxied by divergences in religion 
and language, influence why investor protection differs across countries38. We examine whether a 
similar phenomenon affected the spread of corporations by considering official religions for 191039. 
These religions are not necessarily representative of the populations’ practices and beliefs; for 
instance many colonies, the United States and the Netherlands are recorded as ‘secular’. Finland was 
predominantly Lutheran in 1900 but as a part of the Russian empire this was not the official religion. 
Similarly the Dutch East Indies (present day Indonesia) are for 1900 recorded with an official religion 
of the Dutch Reformed Church despite the great majority of the inhabitants adhering to Islam. But if 
a narrow elite shaped economic institutions, as well as choosing the official religion, then it may be 
the official religion that matters for predicting economic institutions and thus, performance. 
                                                          
36
 Foreman-Peck and Hannah, ‘Extreme Divorce’, p. 1221 for the UK; compare the decadal foundation data for 
1909 German AGs in Statistisches Jahrbuch 1911, p406.  
37 More generally substitutes for legal protection may have facilitated the growth in the numbers of corporations in some 
countries; Campbell and Turner ‘Substitutes’.  
38
 Stulz and Williamson ‘Culture, openness and finance’.  
39
 Barrett World Christian encyclopaedia. 
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Secular economies were significantly more open than the average in 1910, they were significantly 
more corporation-intensive and dominated by corporations (par value as percentage of GDP) (table 
2). Official Protestants, classified as Anglicans plus Lutherans in table 2 - in conformity with Stulz and 
Williamson - were corporation-intensive and Islam and Roman Catholicism were not. But then 
common and Scandinavian law completely overlap the Protestant category. Roman Catholic 
countries, like Islam and ‘others’, were relatively closed economies. 
 Table 2 Religion and regulatory capture c. 1910 
 
Companies/population 
(no. of countries) 
Corporate stock 
value at par/GDP 
(no. of countries) 
Exports per 
head (no. of 
countries) 
Roman Catholic 124 (13) 52 (4) 26 (12) 
Secular 613* (20) 163* (7) 51.4* (16) 
‘Protestant’ 1,434* (5) 70 (5) 54.7 (5) 
Islam 72 (8) 25 (2) 20.4 (6) 
Other 156* (37) 33* (16) 19.7 (23) 
 Note: * signifies significantly different from sample mean at 5% level. 
Political economy considerations in recent times have suggested that majoritarian democratic 
constitutions may provide more investor protection – and therefore more investment in joint stock 
companies - than proportional representation40. Only a few countries had adopted proportional 
representation in 1910 and so Pagano and Volpin’s representation hypothesis arguably is less 
relevant than a century later. Here we focus simply on the degree of democracy as defined by the 
Polity IV index41. This index of democracy–autocracy measures regime authority on a 21-point scale 
ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy without parliamentary constraint) to +10 (consolidated 
democracy). The index constructors also recommend a three-part categorization of "autocracies"     
(-10 to -6), "anocracies"42 (-5 to +5), and "democracies" (+6 to +10). 6 countries in the present 
sample receive a score of +10 and are classified as perfectly functioning or ‘consolidated’ 
democracies in 1910. They are the US, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and Greece. To 
increase the coverage of the index, we assume an index number of -6 for colonies otherwise not 
included.  
                                                          
40
 Pagano and Volpin ‘Political economy of corporate governance’. 
41
 www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
42
 An anocracy is generally a regime where power is vested in elite groups constantly competing for power, 
rather than in public institutions. 
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Table 3 shows that democracy and consolidated democracy were clearly associated with high 
corporate numbers and with a high corporate capital to GDP ratio. Autocracies were linked with 
significantly low corporate numbers but their average ratio of corporate capital to GDP was not 
much lower than that for consolidated democracies. The most open countries measured by exports 
per head were democracies.  
 Table 3: Politics and regulatory capture c. 1910 
 
Corporations per 
mill pop (no. 
countries) 
Corporate stock 
value at par/GDP% 
(no. countries) 
Exports per head 
(no. countries) 
Autocracy (includes 
colonies) 
133* (46) 69.6 (10) 23.9 (28) 
Anocracy 271 (22) 49 (13) 35.1 (19) 
Democracy  1,131* (13) 86.5 (11) 47.9 (13) 
’Consolidated 
Democracy’ 
1,586* (6) 76.8 (5) 51.1 (6) 
 Note: * signifies significantly different from sample mean at 5% level. ‘Consolidated Democracy’  
 is included in the ‘Democracy’ category. 
In the world of 1910 according to Acemoglu and Robinson the imperial framework ensured that 
‘extractive institutions’ were adopted where Europeans did not settle43. Allegedly administrators 
there cared little about aggregate output or the welfare of the indigenous population. Davis and 
Huttenback’s classification of British self-governing colonies correspond with ‘good institution‘ 
colonies (dominions) while dependent colonies and India coincided with ‘extractive institution’ 
colonies44. In this latter dependent British Empire, where coercion was available, it has been 
contended that European institutions and ideals were ignored. The spread or otherwise of the joint 
stock company to such regions offers a test of these views. We can use the corporations data to 
provide a simple test of the Accominotti et al. 2010 hypothesis of British Empire repression of non-
European settled areas. If indigenously registered joint stock companies reflect ‘good’ or ‘inclusive’ 
institutions, then corporations per head is a measure of institutional ‘progress’. 
                                                          
43
 Acemoglu and Robinson Why Nations Fail. Some writers contend that the British were extractive even in 
dominions; Sylla ‘Political economy of financial development’; McQueen, ‘Company law as imperialism’. 
44
 Davis and Huttenback, Mammon and the pursuit of empire Accominotti et al., Black man’s burden. South 
Africa, a dominion in 1910, is somewhat problematic because Acemoglou and Robinson identify it as 
‘extractive’, but it was self-governing and less extractive than it was to become. In 1961 miners’ wages were 12 
percent lower than they had been in 1911 (Acemoglou and Robinson Why Nations Fail p268). 
 13 
 
Our specification of the Accominotti et al. hypothesis requires that joint stock companies were more 
abundant in European settled regions and less abundant elsewhere in the Empire. This is of course a 
simple minded test because other relevant factors may differ between regions – in particular 
productivity, GDP, and proportion of agriculture - but it is a start.  
Indigenous ownership is neither necessary nor sufficient for companies to be inclusive institutions, 
but may be an indication nonetheless. In India, the cotton mill industry was largely in the hands of 
Indians, and the greater proportion of paid up capital among Indian registered companies was in 
cotton and other mills and presses, concentrated in Bombay45. The density of companies in India (at 
12 per million population) was far higher than China’s 146. British India’s ratio of equity capital at par 
to GDP of 24% compares with Austria’s 26% and Spain’s 27%.  
The corporation-intensiveness of non-European settler area Hong Kong, with 1,320 companies per 
million compared with a sample average of 338 and a UK figure of 1,241 also seems unlikely to have 
been possible without some native participation. The Hong Kong population was of course small so 
that the 577 companies recorded yield a very high ‘density’47. But judging from the names of 
individual corporate liquidations in the Hong Kong Government Gazette, Hong Kong company 
registration was not just used by the small numbers of the colonial white business elite but also by 
the native Chinese bourgeoisie. Prosperous examples can be found both in Hong Kong (e.g. Kwong 
Hip Lung, the Kowloon engineers and shipbuilders registered in 1890) and in mainland China (e.g. 
Nanyang Brothers Tobacco and Lao Kung Mao, Shanghai cotton spinners). Hong Kong registrations 
were even utilised by companies operating in Japan (e.g Kirin Beer until 1907) and elsewhere in 
Asia48.   
The Federated Malay States’ Mines Department Reports mention numerous corporate tin mines 
mainly owned by ethnic Europeans and Chinese. The initial impression then is that the British 
administration of law and order created a more favourable environment for corporate development 
                                                          
45
 British Parliamentary Papers Moral and material progress, p60. 
46
 The Tata Iron and Steel Company was formed in 1907 ‘with a large capital’ and began work early in 1912 
British Parliamentary Papers, Moral and material progress p57. 
47
 German South West Africa (modern Namibia) casts a contrasting light to Hong Kong. Here there were a few 
European settlers backed up by substantial armed force exercised against the indigenous inhabitants. The 116 
companies in South West Africa were apparently exclusively formed by Europeans. The colony illustrates the 
difficulty of using population as the denominator in countries where the native population hardly participated 
in the modern sector at all. In the deserts of South West Africa, the native population was tiny. It is essentially 
the denominator, not the numerator that creates the impression of much greater use of the corporate form in 
South West Africa, where the corporate density was higher than in Germany itself.  
48
 Wright Impressions of Hongkong. 196-249; Lee ‘Chinese Merchants’  pp. 61-86; Chung Chinese Business 
Groups pp. 53-5, 171 
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in the colonies – not exclusively for Europeans - than did the surrounding states. But the 
consequences of such development remain to be demonstrated. 
Consistent with the Accominotti et al hypothesis, table 4 shows first that British Empire areas 
controlled by European settlers were significantly more corporation-intensive than the rest of the 
sample average, though on average a little less than the UK. The six countries involved were 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Newfoundland, South Africa and Rhodesia. The inclusion of the last 
two might be contested – Rhodesia only acquired effective dominion status in 1923 - but the critical 
element of the Accominotti et al. theory is a substantial body of Europeans in a strong position to 
bargain. Not consistent with the hypothesis is that, although the British Empire regions not 
extensively settled by Europeans had a lower mean number of companies than the rest of the world, 
the difference is statistically insignificant and the mean is far higher than for independent poor 
countries. For comparison French and German colonial averages are included. The French average is 
much lower than the rest of the world, significant on a one tailed test at the five percent level, and 
the figure for France itself (306) is also lower than the rest of the world. The German average is 
buoyed up by South West Africa (see footnote 47). 
 Table 4: British Empire Corporatisation in 1910 versus the Rest 
 Companies per million pop (no. countries) 
British Empire-European settlers control 1,207* (6) 
British Empire-Indigenous majority 196 (13) 
French colonies 44 (11) 
German colonies 279 (6) 
Independent poor countries 15 (8) 
 Note: ‘independent poor’ defined as under $900 in 1913 GDP per capita as in Maddison 2010; 
 Afghanistan, Brazil, China, Columbia, Ethiopia, Morocco, Nepal, Siam. 
The mean corporate stock value at par as a percentage of GDP for the four British Empire European 
settler countries for which we have data was 103% compared with 162% for the UK. For only two 
British ‘colonies’ with an indigenous majority do we have ratios of share capital to GDP, India and 
Hong Kong. Between them they average 252% which might be interpreted either from the 
triumphalist view point as the substantial benefits of empire, or from Gilbert and Sullivan’s position 
as a sign of exploitative foreign capital in enclave economies. But the ratio is sharply dichotomous; 
Hong Kong’s 480% hardly compares with India’s 24%. 
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Bivariate associations among ‘fundamental’ variables thus suggest that some combination of 
democracy, Protestantism, common or Scandinavian civil law and being a European settler British 
Empire country provided the conditions for maximum corporatisation. All top scorers on the 
companies per million population indicator (the US, Canada and Norway) have three or four of these 
characteristics and other countries that have them are not far behind (New Zealand, Australia).  
Whereas culture, law and politics can reasonably be regarded as exogenous to corporatization, trade 
may be simultaneously determined with it; descriptive associations are therefore less likely to 
indicate causation. If political and economic elites restrict competition from imports then resources 
will be diverted to substitute domestic production away from exports. Consistent with their theory, 
Rajan and Zingales find a positive correlation of trade volume/GDP with publicly listed companies for 
191349. Similarly our figure 2 with a much larger sample shows a close relationship between more 
general corporatisation and export intensity (per head) in this period of high capital mobility50. The 
figure is consistent with interest groups blocking new competition in more closed economies, but 
also accords with other hypotheses. These include the beneficial effects on productivity and 
international competitiveness of more companies, and the usefulness of the corporate form for 
trade over longer distances.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
49
 Rajan and Zingales ‘The great reversals’. 
50
 In figure 2 the US is an important outlier which, since it accounts for more than 55 percent of global 
corporations in 1910, might be considered troubling. But we must recognise that more than one variable 
influences the density of companies. The US was extraordinarily liberal in chartering companies and internal 
commercial regulation while being extremely protectionist in trade policy. 
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 Figure 2: Exports and the international spread of companies 
 
III 
To go beyond simple association and establish the nature of the interplay between the variables we 
have been considering we use a three equation formal model. The stock of companies (C) in a 
country i might depend on many variables; including culture/religion, law, and politics (all Z1 in 
equation 1 below), it is likely to increase as income (Y) expands demand and with exports (X), 
whether because companies are set up to export or because greater trade intensity limits regulatory 
capture. 
  Ci = α0 + α1Xi + α2Yi + α3 Z1i + ε1i                         … (1) 
Capture of trade policy may be measured by lower exports (X) as a response to trade barriers or 
restrictive practices. But export intensity is likely to depend on other factors – such as the size of the 
economy. Smaller countries, measured by population (Pop) and income or GDP per capita (Y), 
normally trade more relative to GDP. When corporations were as beneficial as western triumphalism 
indicates then more corporations should have permitted or stimulated greater exports, as in 
equation 2 with β1>0. Other, institutional or political factors are included in Z2. 
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Xi = β0 + β1Ci + β2Popi + β3 Yi + β4 Z2i + ε2i                    … (2)  
If corporations were important contributors to economic well-being, they would influence an 
economy through the volume and productivity of the savings that they transform into investment 
and future output. This in turn would raise long run national income or output per head, Y, in which 
case in equation 3 γ1>0
51. In addition to the channelling of capital to productive uses, human capital 
is widely believed to matter for utilising equipment efficiently. The best measure we have for a wide 
range of countries in 1910 is literacy (Lit). All other measurable influences are covered by Z3 
Yi = γ0 + γ 1 Ci + γ 2 Liti + γ 3 Z3i+ ε3i                                    ... (3) 
In the above equations ε1  ... ε3 are independent, normally distributed random disturbance terms 
with zero means.    
 
Matching all the variables specified in the model across countries restricts the number of economies 
that can be considered to a minimum of 51, using the Maddison GDP figures52. This means our 
British colony cases are restricted to Ceylon, Malaya, Gold Coast, India and Straits Settlements. But 
the representation of Africa can be increased by utilising Prados de la Escosura’s GDP estimates53. 
These allow us to include Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda in the corporations and export equations 
(1 and 2) as well, shifting the centre of colonial gravity away from Asia. The colonial results 
accordingly are somewhat sensitive to the two variables. The complete data set is in online appendix 
A. 
 
Consistent estimates of the coefficients of this model require that the error terms of the estimating 
equations be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. If equations 1, 2 and 3 are, in practice, 
simultaneously determined (all coefficients are non-zero), this condition will not be fulfilled. We 
therefore adopt instrumental variable methods, with both single equation (2SLS) and system (3SLS) 
estimates. 
 
Table 5 displays estimates of model equation (1). At around 80 percent the explained variances of 
the equations are high for international cross-section data, indicating that systematic explanation of 
the international spread of companies in 1910 is quite complete. Equation 5.1, estimated by OLS, 
                                                          
51
 With this model we cannot say anything about induced changes in income distribution, which is also 
potentially relevant to assessing the contribution of companies. 
52
 Maddison ‘Statistics’ 
53
 Prados de la Escosura ‘Pre-Independence Africa’, table B3. 
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covers 51 countries. The apparent GDP elasticity is a little above unity and statistically significant, 
while the export elasticity is less than half of the GDP elasticity. Scandinavian civil law shows a 
consistently high propensity to host companies even when incomes and exports are controlled. The 
propensity is considerably higher than that indicated by the nonetheless large and significant 
common law countries’ coefficient. That they are both important influences on the stocks of 
companies despite different legal systems suggests a common factor between these two groups of 
countries other than the legal system. The likely factor is the ease with which companies could be 
created, in contrast to French and German civil law countries or independent poor economies (none 
of these variables were significant at the 5 percent level when included in the OLS model, equation 
5.2. Surprisingly, no other bivariate association of section 2 (political regime, official religion) is 
generally statistically significant (equations 5.3, 5.4).  Instrumenting of GDP and exports is 
undertaken with equation 5.554.  In fact the coefficients differ little from the OLS estimates of 
equation 5.1.  
                                                          
54
 Instruments are the log of population, consolidated democracy, literacy, and the official religion of Islam. 
Hanson’s J statistic is consistent with instrument validity, the absence of correlation with unmeasured 
determinants of the spread of corporations, and the KP LM statistic is highly significant in rejecting the null of 
under-identification. The weak identification statistic indicates that the instrumented variable coefficients may 
be only slightly biased (between 5 and 10% maximal relative bias). 
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Table 5: Determinants of the International Spread of (log) Corporations in 1910 
 
(5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) (5.6) (5.7) 
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 
        
ln GDP p.c. (ly) 1.223*** 1.200*** 1.213*** 0.870** 1.268*** 0.844** 1 
 
(5.69) (4.90) (4.87) (3.06) (4.53) (2.77) (imposed) 
        
export intensity (lx) 0.530*** 0.575*** 0.525** 0.584*** 0.655*** 0.806*** 0.600*** 
 
(4.00) (4.22) (3.48) (4.53) (3.45) (4.18) (6.45) 
        
Scand. civil law 1.687*** 1.995*** 1.781*** 1.731*** 1.499*** 1.574*** 1.759*** 
 
(4.89) (4.55) (4.92) (5.72) (4.41) (5.11) (5.35) 
        
common law 0.982** 1.283** 0.714* 0.937** 0.804** 1.581** 1.660** 
 
(3.33) (3.24) (2.28) (3.17) (2.64) (2.90) (3.33) 
        
Fr. civil law 
 
0.259 
     
  
(0.73) 
     
German civil law 
 
0.742 
     
  
(1.88) 
     
independent poor 
 
0.105 
     
  
(0.20) 
     
        
Roman Catholic 
  
0.0210 
    
   
(0.06) 
    
secular 
  
0.654 
    
   
(1.56) 
    
Islam 
  
0.0273 
    
   
(0.06) 
    
        
democracy 
   
0.282 
   
    
(0.93) 
   
autocracy 
   
-0.344 
   
    
(-0.99) 
   
consolidated democracy 
   
0.244 
(0.97)    
British dominion 
     
-0.373 -0.195 
      
(-0.62) (-0.35) 
British colony 
     
-1.499* -1.329* 
      
(-2.17) (-2.53) 
N 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 
R-sq 0.825 0.837 0.839 0.837 0.817 0.835 0.722 
instrumented 
    
ly, lx ly, lx 
 
excluded exogenous 
    
literacy, consol, islam, pop 
 
weak id. stat. 
    
11.53 9.424 
 
id. stat. (prob.) 
    
9.595 (0.022) 10.47 (0.015) 
 
Hansen's j stat. (pr.) 
    
2.761 (0.251) 1.537 (0.464) 
 
Note: robust t statistics in parentheses,* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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To test our version of the Accominotti et al. hypothesis indicators of British dominion or colony 
status are added in equation 5.6. The negative British colony coefficient is almost exactly cancelled 
out by the positive common law coefficient. This suggests that these colonies were neither 
precocious nor backward in forming companies; the advantages of common law or liberal regimes 
were offset by the disadvantages of colonial status, once the effects of GDP and exports have been 
controlled.  Dominion status, on the other hand, conferred the advantages of common law or a 
liberal regime without other disadvantages.  
 
A DWH test of exports indicated that the null of exogeneity could not be rejected55. Then, since the 
unconstrained elasticity is not significantly different from one, a unit elasticity may be imposed on 
GDP per capita and the company equations estimated by OLS (5.7). Equation 5.7 confirms the result 
that export elasticity is about 0.6 and the common law and British colony coefficients are about 
equal and opposite. According to the RZ hypothesis the responsiveness of company numbers to 
exports reflects the reduced chances in a more open economy for agreements in restraint of trade. 
But as noted above there are other- not mutually exclusive- explanations, for the association. Re-
estimating table 5 with the three extra African observations does not affect the coefficient estimate 
significantly (the British colony coefficients are-1.580 and 1.446 in the last two equations). 
Estimates of model equation 2 are in table 6. If as suggested in the preceding paragraph, exports are 
exogenous to companies, then companies should not be a significant influence on exports and the 
coefficient on companies in an OLS exports regression (such as 6.1) will reflect reverse causation. 
Instrumenting should render the coefficient small and insignificantly different from zero, as is 
apparent in equations 6.2 and 6.4. β1 in model equation 2 can be regarded as zero.  
The income elasticity of exports is significantly greater than one, once company numbers has been 
dropped from the specification (6.3 and 6.5). The population control for ‘natural openness’ has the 
expected highly significant negative sign in all export equations. All equations show that, after 
controlling for population and GDP, British colonies are significantly export-orientated, unlike 
dominions. Consolidated democracies are significantly averse to exporting (equations 6.4- 6.6) 
which, bearing in mind the Rajan and Zingales hypothesis, may imply that these polities are 
especially prone to special interest lobbying. A corollary may be that the opposite was true of British 
colonies. The coefficient on British colonies in 6.5 and 6.6 of 1.11 implies that they exported 200 
                                                          
55
 Using as instruments log of population and literacy for log export intensity in specification 5.5; 
H0: Regressor is exogenous 
    Wu-Hausman F test:                   0.80789  F(1,45)     P-value = 0.37353 
    Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test:       0.89946  Chi-sq(1)   P-value = 0.34293    
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percent more than did other jurisdictions (exp(1.11)-1)*100). This result is reversed by adding in the 
three African colonies by using the Prados de la Escosura GDP series (equation 6.7); the larger British 
colonies group are no longer statistically significant exporters after GDP and population have been 
controlled. One reason may be that the African colonies were recent acquisitions compared with 
India, Ceylon and the Straits Settlements and the full export effects of colonial administration had 
not yet transpired. 
Table 6: Determinants of (log.) Export Intensity  
 
(6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) (6.5) (6.6) (6.7) 
Estimation OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
        
ln. GDP p.c. (ly) 0.989*** 1.364** 1.406*** 1.329*** 1.537*** 1.539*** 1.610*** 
 
(3.88) (3.10) (8.99) (3.49) (10.00) (10.97) (11.25) 
        
ln. corporations (lc) 0.210* 0.0175 
 
0.0871 
   
 
(2.47) (0.13) 
 
(0.72) 
   
        
ln. population (lpop) -0.270*** -0.329*** -0.334*** -0.323*** -0.348*** -0.348*** -0.347*** 
 
(-4.39) (-4.61) (-6.27) (-5.60) (-7.01) (-6.61) (-6.12) 
        
British colony 0.973** 1.112** 1.129** 1.033** 1.115*** 1.116** 0.493 
 
(2.84) (3.02) (3.27) (3.03) (3.39) (3.15) (1.29) 
        
British dominion 0.0164 0.240 0.256 0.349 0.428 0.427 0.239 
 
(0.05) (0.60) (0.57) (1.02) (1.02) (0.95) (0.88) 
        
consolidated 
democracy    
-0.689*** -0.696** -0.698** -0.669** 
    
(-3.33) (-2.90) (-2.89) (-3.15) 
        
N 51 51 51 51 51 51 54 
R-sq 0.811 0.791 0.787 0.825 0.809 0.809 0.782 
instrumented 
 
lc ly lc lc ly ly 
 
ly (Prados 
extended) 
excluded 
exogenous  
common law, scand civil law, literacy 
 
As in 6.2-6.5 
weak id stat 
 
5.992 142.2 5.672 108.1 
 
101.5 
id stat 
 
8.165 24.17 8.864 21.69 
 
21.88 
id prob. 
 
0.0169 0.0000231 0.0119 0.0000758 
 
0.0000692 
Hansen's j stat. 
 
0.113 0.113 0.866 1.146 
 
0.690 
j stat. prob. 
 
0.737 0.945 0.352 0.564 
 
0.708 
Note: Constants included but not reported. Robust t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.05 ** p<0.01      
*** p<0.001 
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In table 7 are estimates of versions of equation 3 of the model. Corporations and literacy are highly 
significantly associated with GDP in all of them. Equation 7.1 combines the basic specification with 
legal systems and shows that Scandinavian and German civil law have adverse impacts on income. 
While the second variable sign is consistent with the excessively repressive operation of German 
legal influenced administrations, the first suggests the Scandinavian liberal legal tradition may have 
erred in the opposite direction. In equation 7.2, unlike ‘consolidated democracy’ or ‘autocracy’, 
‘democracy’ exercises a statistically significant effect on GDP but in equation 7.3 a selection of 
religious variables do not. (When ‘democracy’ is combined with the two significant legal measures it 
ceases to be significant, equation not tabulated). Equation 7.4 instruments corporations, bringing 
down the corporations elasticity a little from the OLS estimate56. In equation 7.5 the British 
dominion and colony variables are added but neither are statistically significant influences on GDP. 
Using the larger data set the only substantive change is that the corporations’ elasticity of GDP rises 
and the negative effect of British colonial status on GDP increases, but remains non-significant at the 
5 percent level (equation 7.6)57. Replacing the company numbers with a company stock value 
variable in the final (OLS) equation (7.7) gives greater weight (to more often) quoted big firms than 
does the number of companies 58.. Stock value to GDP yields a rather higher elasticity of 0.13, with 29 
observations, but finding suitable instruments for the equation proved problematic. The most 
defensible estimate of the effect of companies on income then is the elasticity of 0.095 in equation 
7.4. That is, an economy with double the number of corporations per head of another would have 
GDP per head higher by 9.5 percent, other things being equal. 
 
                                                          
56
 The diagnostics indicate these instruments are valid and relevant. The weak identification test (Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald F statistic) implies there is a less than 10% maximal IV size bias. 
57
 In both smaller and larger samples when the ‘independent poor country’ variable is introduced it is not 
significantly different from the British colony coefficient (larger regression sample independents are Brazil, 
China, Columbia, Ethiopia, Morocco and Nepal). 
58
 In the US our measure will be about 550% of NYSE capitalisation (and 250% of all quoted firms), while in 
some countries it is only 120% of stock market capitalisation. 
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Table 7: Determinants of (log) GDP per head  
 
(7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) (7.5) (7.6) (7.7) 
Estimation OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS ly4 OLS 
        
ln. corporations (lc) 0.133*** 0.114*** 0.131*** 0.0948*** 0.131*** 0.144*** 
 
 
(5.17) (4.64) (4.76) (3.57) (4.18) (3.39) 
 
        
literacy 0.0148*** 0.0123*** 0.0147*** 0.0162*** 0.0144*** 0.0149*** 0.0189*** 
 
(11.25) (7.25) (9.28) (12.63) (8.51) (6.80) (11.05) 
        
common law -0.0846 
      
 
(-0.72) 
      
Scand. civil law -0.504* 
  
-0.481** -0.520** -0.550** -0.361 
 
(-2.38) 
  
(-2.63) (-2.93) (-2.95) (-1.53) 
Fr. civil law 0.0592 
      
 
(0.50) 
      
German civil law -0.271* 
  
-0.312*** -0.306*** -0.276*** -0.273* 
 
(-2.28) 
  
(-3.88) (-3.93) (-3.41) (-2.19) 
        
democracy 
 
0.211* 
     
  
(2.44) 
     
autocracy 
 
-0.0307 
     
  
(-0.25) 
     
consolidated 
democracy  
-0.0405 
     
  
(-0.22) 
     
        
secular 
  
-0.0291 
    
   
(-0.34) 
    
Protestant 
  
-0.198 
    
   
(-0.85) 
    
Roman Catholic 
  
0.153 
    
   
(1.05) 
    
Islam 
  
0.174 
    
   
(1.40) 
    
        
British dominion 
    
-0.0748 -0.107 
 
     
(-0.37) (-0.64) 
 
British colony 
    
-0.159 -0.178 
 
     
(-1.72) (-1.93) 
 
        
ln. corp. stock 
value.GDP       
0.133** 
(2.87) 
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N 53 53 53 53 53 63 29 
R-sq 0.870 0.828 0.835 0.865 0.869 0.866 0.870 
instrumented 
   
lc lc lc 
 
excluded exogenous 
   
Common law, ln. population 
 
weak id stat 
   
20.70 16.60 14.83 
 
id stat. (pr.) 
   
10.52 (0.005) 8.782 (0.012) 9.336 (0.009) 
 
Hansen's j stat. (pr.) 
   
1.108 (0.293) 0.703 (0.402) 1.195 (0.274) 
 
Note: constants included but not reported. Robust t statistics in parentheses, *p<0.05 ** p<0.01 
*** <0.001  
For comparison with the 2SLS estimates of tables 5 - 7 we also estimated a specification of the 
model by 3SLS (online appendix B)59. This confirms the overall qualitative conclusions that openness 
encouraged companies, as did higher incomes. In the first equation common law and Scandinavian 
law regimes were highly conducive to a bigger stock of companies but in British colonies (unlike 
dominions) the common law effect was largely or completely offset by some other characteristic. 
British colonies were unusually open but their coefficient in the (second) export equation is no 
longer statistically significant in the slightly larger sample, as in the 2SLS estimates of table 6. 
Consolidated democracies were the opposite of the British colonies in their trade behaviour but, in 
contrast to the 2SLS results, the effects are not statistically significant. The third (GDP) equation 
estimates a higher GDP per elasticity of companies (0.014), and finds adverse impacts of 
Scandinavian and German civil law systems but no significant effect for British colonies. This implies 
that these colonies, in the smaller sample only, experienced slightly higher GDPs than if they had not 
been colonies because of the export boost to corporations (which may have been an administration 
effect) operating through a larger stock of companies. By contrast the dominions received a bigger 
lift from the common law legal system which was not offset by other administrative features. 
Extending the data set with the three extra African economies, diminishes the significance of the 
export effect as with the 2SLS estimates, so it is possible to maintain with this model that the 
colonial British empire made no gains as well as no losses for members. One interpretation of these 
results is that the Asian colonies gained and the African colonies lost. 
The three equations of the model interact so that the effect on numbers of companies (C), or 
through numbers of companies and openness to GDP per capita (Y), of an exogenous variable such 
as common law is not identical to the coefficient in the estimated equation. Since we have found 
                                                          
59 3SLS is more efficient than 2SLS in that it uses information from the covariance matrix of disturbance terms 
but if one equation in the system is mis-specified, all the coefficients will be biased and inconsistent, whereas 
with 2SLS only the one equation is affected. Moreover with 2SLS the instruments can be used more selectively, 
which can be advantageous. 
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that β1=0, the model can be solved for companies and GDP in term of exogenous variables as below 
(ignoring constants and control variables population and literacy); 
C  = [α3Z1 + α1 β4Z2 + γ3(α1 β3 + α2)Z3]/(1 - γ1(α1 β3 + α2))                       … (4) 
Y  =  [γ1α3Z1 +  γ1 α1 β4 Z2 + γ3 Z3]/(1 - γ1(α1 β3 + α2))                       … (5) 
Z1 includes common and Scandinavian civil law
60, Z2 includes consolidated democracy
61, and Z3 
includes Scandinavian and German civil law. 
We have established that plausible values are γ1=0.095, α1 =0.6, β3= 1.5, α2= 1, and α3=0.8 for 
common law. Hence the common law effect on companies is 0.8/0.819=0.98. Since C is in logs the 
effect is to raise company numbers by (exp(.98)-1)*100 percent=166% (table 8). But the number 
could be larger given the variability of α3Z1 in table 5. The four institutional and political regimes 
offer all possibilities of response to corporations and effects on them (table 8). Common law 
regimes, as the bulk of the literature implies, were the most favourable both to numbers of 
companies and to GDP per capita generated as a consequence. Three of the six consolidated 
democracies also adhered to common law. Table 8 shows that the common law system much more 
than offset their economic disadvantage (which we attribute to special interest lobby power).  
 Table 8: Contribution of institutional arrangements and political system to company numbers  
 and thereby to GDP per capita on the eve of the First World War 
 Percentage change in 
company numbers 
Percentage change in 
GDP per head 
Common law regime +93 +6.4 
Scandinavian law regime +70 -25 
German civil law regime -23 -20 
Consolidated democracy -27 -3 
                                                          
60
 It also includes British colonies but as we have noted this effect is cancelled out by that of common law. 
61
 The ambiguity about the British colonies’ effect stemming from currently available small sample sizes here 
warrants their exclusion from the following exercise for the moment. 
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British dominions adopted common law regimes and therefore attained benefits from empire 
through this channel. British colonies, however, do not seem to have gained nor did they through 
their export orientation, at least when sufficient African colonies are included in the sample. The 
surprise is Scandinavian civil law regimes which, controlling for their large numbers of companies, 
have lower GDPs, perhaps because the companies were insufficiently regulated, the opposite to 
German civil law regimes. Some Norwegian opinion believed that Norway suffered from having no 
statutory company law because people (especially foreign investors) were unsure of their legal 
standing. Indeed that was why Norway introduced a corporate statute in 1910. Our estimated 
equation implies that Scandinavian civil law administration put these countries approximately on a 
par with (higher income) France. With four times as many companies Scandinavia would have had a 
GDP per capita almost 40 per cent higher than France’s for this reason, had it not been for some 
offset. The coefficient on Scandinavian civil law pulls back Scandinavian GDP per capita the level that 
would have been attained without this negative coefficient but with French numbers of companies 
per capita. 
IV 
We have shown that the international spread of numbers of corporations in 1910 can be well 
explained by a few influences – GDP, legal regime and export intensity. For interpreting this last we 
adopt Rajan and Zingales’ hypothesis that the extent of trade openness is an indication of 
administrative openness, and lack of policy bias towards incumbent interest groups62. We have 
extended Rajan and Zingales’ conclusions for quoted companies to a larger range of countries, 
measuring both quoted and unquoted companies before the First World War. Combined listed and 
unlisted corporations on average promoted economic development by their mobilisation of capital. 
On average there they were not captured by fraudsters or incompetents so that the capital was 
stolen or wasted, as Gilbert and Sullivan feared. This is consistent with corporations being an 
‘inclusive’ or ‘good’ institution: their international spread by 1910 was associated with development 
across much of the world. 
Official religious adherence, or political systems, did not show the predicted direct effects on 
corporatisation in multivariate tests, because these factors are highly correlated with the 
fundamental ones identified here: legal system, trade openness and level of development. But we 
establish that it is not common, in contrast to civil, law that matters for the international spread of 
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companies, as might be inferred from LaPorta et al.63. Instead we interpret the role of the 
Scandinavian civil law and common law variables as reflecting liberal (laissez-faire) industrial policies 
that allowed corporations to flourish, consistent with Musacchio and Turner’s position.64 These 
groups of countries clearly gained substantially from their politico-legal regimes, although 
Scandinavia would perhaps have benefitted from a less laissez-faire stance. Trade openness may 
have lowered predispositions, or reflected reduced tendencies, to protection of incumbent interests 
that inhibited company formation. The consolidated democracy adverse impact on exports is 
consistent with interest group capture, pursuing the Rajan and Zingales approach, partly offsetting 
the effects of a liberal legal regime. This will have been especially significant for the United States 
where so many of the world’s corporations were to be found in 1910.  
The explicit test of our version of the Accominotti et al. hypothesis about the repressive effects of 
the dependent British Empire, in contrast to the settler controlled British Empire, finds support from 
our analysis65. This is consistent with colonies being more exploitative/less developmental than 
dominions in other areas than company formation. Company law is a public good: almost non-
excludable and with low marginal costs per company after set-up. The extra costs of admitting those 
of subordinate status to company law (as opposed to, say, educating them) was small and excluding 
or limiting them was apparently never contemplated by Britain66.  
The positive impact of corporatization in 1910 on GDP suggests that the eventual massive expansion 
of the corporate form in both civil and common law countries – corporate numbers multiplied about 
one hundred-fold in the century after our cross-section of 1910 – was probably also growth-
enhancing. Gilbert and Sullivan were wrong: the World Bank and western triumphalists still draw 
less audience applause, but –at least in this area –are nearer the mark. 
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